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State and Local Governments Address
the Twin Challenges of Climate Change
and Energy Alternatives
Irma S. Russell and Jeffery S. Dennis

L

awmakers, regulators, and the world all face a perfect storm of energy and climate challenges, and

that storm is converging on traditional electricity
policy. The cost of electricity to consumers is rising
at an alarming rate. At the same time, news of global climate
change and of the United States' role in it has focused all
levels of government on the issue of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, particularly from the energy sector. The increasing
scientific and public consensus regarding the threat of climate
change, and the contribution of our energy use to that threat,
have moved consumers and policymakers alike to demand
alternatives to fossil fuel sources of generation.
However, with an aging infrastructure and dwindling
electricity supply, new facilities are needed to bring alternative
energy supplies. The twin challenges of increasing demand
and fears of global climate change converge on the electric
utility sector, with the result that lawmakers and regulators
at all government levels face new dimensions to the competing priorities of encouraging the introduction of alternative
sources of supply, addressing the problem of climate change,
and maintaining cheap and reliable energy.
In the absence of a comprehensive federal framework,
states, local governments, and regional groups have embarked
on a number of new programs and initiatives to address these
complex issues. The developments of the last few years show
that state and local governments and regional bodies have
a place as regulators in the climate change arena. Indeed,
regional bodies and state and local governments have moved
to the forefront in carbon regulation. Nevertheless, federal
legislation currently under consideration does not include
an explicit role for these governments. "Six comprehensive
climate change bills are now pending in Congress, and all are
focused predominately on the role of the federal government."
Robert B. McKinstry, John C. Dernbach, Thomas D. Peterson,
Federal Climate Change Legislation as if the States Matter, 22
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Given the combined pressures of climate change and rising
energy prices, and the absence of comprehensive federal action,
state and local governments-as they often have in the pastare once again "laboratories" for testing new policies and regulatory approaches. Policymakers at these levels of government are
instituting programs to combat climate change. At the same
time, both as a result of new climate change policies and in
response to higher electricity costs and enhanced need for new
sources of electricity supply, state lawmakers and regulators are
enacting new energy policies, and in many respects are moving
into the forefront in this area as well. The actions they take now
are changing electricity policy in significant ways, and putting
new pressure on traditional methods of electricity regulation.

Traditional Regulation Under Pressure
The traditional model used by states to regulate electric
utilities was centered on a relatively simple "cost of service"
approach. This cost-based system of regulation required that the
utilities make the most cost-effective (usually, least expensive)
and prudent investments. State regulators monitored the utilities, overseeing utility service and approving the investments.
The rates for electric service approved by regulators and paid by
consumers allowed utilities to recover the cost of those investments, plus a reasonable rate of return. Under this system, one
incentive dominated in utility decision making: sell more electricity, and make more money. As the utility served increasing
customer demand, it earned a higher return. Even in states that
attempted to restructure their electricity industries and introduce competition, the same incentives continue to dominate.
This regulatory model (and its resulting incentives) becomes
problematic, however, when the least expensive sources of
electricity supply from a monetary perspective cannot be viewed
as prudent in light of their contribution to GHG emissions.
Moreover, the best alternative may not be building a new supply
source to serve increased demand, but actually reducing demand
and, thus, reducing the need for that supply source. The traditional model's incentive to expand usage, and thereby increase
profits for the utility, encourages ever-increasing demand and
discourages actions that could curb demand. In light of the fact
that GHG emissions result from combustion of biofuels as well
as fossil fuels, the volume-based incentive of the traditional
model undermines the goal of reducing GHG productionwhatever the source of combustion utilized.
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The federal government's measure of carbon intensity, which
folds production levels into the measure, exacerbates this problem by making it impossible to evaluate progress toward actual
reduction of GHG emissions. Deduction of GHG in relation
to production (intensity) continues the incentives for production of goods (and carbon) without regard to the need (or
absence of need) for the goods produced. The carbon emissions'
measure of intensity improves as long as the ratio of production
to carbon improves. A rise in the level of production shows a
benefit in the carbon intensity measure if production rises and
carbon emission levels remain the same. In fact, even when the
absolute level of carbon increases, the intensity measure nevertheless shows improvement if the production level rises more
than the emissions level. Thus, the intensity measure used does
not reveal whether carbon emissions are reduced. Likewise, the
utility of the good is not a factor for consideration. Even factoring into the equation the costs associated with GHG emissions
would not mean that the regulatory mechanisms based on the
quantity-profit model would correct for such costs.
The strain on the traditional mode of regulating utility
service at the state level has become more pronounced as state
and local governments and regional organizations have adopted measures aimed at combating global climate change. Scientists estimate that approximately 55 percent of global climate
change is attributable to carbon dioxide emissions from coal
and petroleum use. See www.powerscorecard.org/sc_details.
cfm (last visited Jan. 2, 2007). The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and other entities have also recognized the
link between climate change and energy use, particularly with
regard to transportation" and power plants. See 2006-2011 EPA
Strategic Plan, presented to Congress September 29, 2006, at
www.epa.gov/ocfo/plan/plan.htm.
As a result of the link between power plants and climate
change, electricity generators are a central target of efforts to
address climate change at the state, local, and regional levels.
For example, the initial phase of the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI), a well-documented agreement among
nine northeastern states to limit GHG emissions, is entirely
directed at "stabilizing and then reducing" carbon dioxide
emissions from fossil-fueled power plants larger than 25 megawatts. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Memorandum
of Understanding (Dec. 20, 2005). Recent climate change
legislation in Washington State is also directed entirely at
electric utilities, establishing emissions performance standards
for certain power plants. 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws Ch. 307. California public utility regulators have also established interim
power plant emissions performance standards as part of their
implementation of that state's climate change program. See
In re Integration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards,
2007 Cal. PUC LEXIS 66 (Jan. 25, 2007). An executive order
issued in July 2007 by Governor Charlie Christ of Florida provides another example, specifically requiring the development
of rules to limit utility sector emissions. Fla. Gov. Exec. Order
No. 07-127 (July 13, 2007).
Local governments are also acting in ways that will impact
electricity. By the end of 2007, over 710 cities had signed the

U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, pledging to take
steps to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. The agreement
was initiated by Mayor Greg Nickels of Seattle, Washington,
on February 16, 2005, the day the Kyoto Protocol took effect in
the 141 nations that ratified it. On June 13, 2005, the Mayors
Climate Protection Agreement was formally adopted by the U.S.
Conference of Mayors. The nonbinding agreement pledges that
the city will strive to meet or exceed the reduction of emissions
to 7 percent below the 1990 level by the year 2012. Under the
agreement, participating cities pledge to strive to achieve the
Kyoto Protocol targets in their communities. The cities also have
urged state governments and the federal government to enact
policies to meet the GHG reduction targets suggested for the
United States in the Kyoto Protocol of 7 percent reduction from
1990 levels by 2012. See U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, www.seattle.gov/mayor/climate (last visited Feb. 26, 2008).
The efforts of the city of Austin, Texas, provide an example
of some of the ambitious initiatives at the local level that impact
electricity production. Its plug-in partner campaign encourages
people to sign petitions for "soft orders" of electric hybrid cars.
Austin Energy, the city-owned utility, provides 214 megawatts of
wind energy from West Texas wind farms and generates 13 megawatts from methane at local landfills. Austin requires all new city
buildings to meet the LEED silver rating. Austin has committed
to make all city facilities, operations, and fleets carbon-neutral
by 2020. To accomplish this goal, Austin pledged the following
measures: powering 100 percent of city facilities with renewable
energy by 2012; saving 700 megawatts through energy-efficiency
by 2020 and with 30 percent of all energy provided by renewable
resources by that year; making all new single-family homes zero
net-energy capable by 2015 and increasing all new construction energy efficiency by 75 percent by that same year; taking
an inventory of communitywide greenhouse gas emissions; and
work with stakeholders to create a plan for reductions. See Press
Release, City of Austin, National Coalition Launches Campaign
to Urge Automakers to Produce Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles (Jan.
24, 2006), www.ci.austin.tx.us/news/2006/aeplugin partners.
htm; Austin Energy, Power Plants, www.austinenergy.com/
About%20Us/Company%2OProfile/powerPlants.htm (last visited
July 8, 2008); City Council of the City of Austin, Resolution No.
000608-43 (June 8, 2000), www.cityofaustin.org/edims/document.
cfm?id=59126; Press Release, City of Austin, Wynn Announces
Austin Climate Protection Plan (Feb. 7, 2007), www.ci.austin.
tx.us/council/mw.acppjrelease.htm.
Many other cities have taken comparable steps in response to
the problem of global warming. See, e.g., ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability, www.iclei-usa.org/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2008). Even before state and local governments and regional
bodies began addressing climate change and the contributions of
energy production to GHG emissions, costs for electricity service
were on the rise. As a result, electricity prices have steadily-and in
some cases, dramatically-increased. According to the most recent
statistics compiled by the Energy Information Administration
(EIA), the average retail price for electricity increased 9.3 percent
from 2005 to 2006. The EIA also reports that in fourteen states
and the District of Columbia, prices rose by more than 10 percent
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during this period. Additionally, the EIA reported that, since 2000,
prices for all sectors have increased approximately 30 percent. In
a few of the states that passed laws to introduce competition into
their retail electric markets, the expiration of legislatively mandated rate caps have produced dramatic rate increases. U.S. ENERGY
INFoRmAmToN ADMiNsRATnIo, Etcruc PowER AiN'a.L REFoRT
2006 at 9, 57 (Nov. 2007) (hereinafter EIA).
Much of the increase in costs-and as a result, prices--can be
attributed to the rising cost of fossil fuels used to generate electric
power. The rise in the price of natural gas has been particularly
notable. According to EIA, most of the new electric generation
capacity placed in service since 1999 has been natural-gas fired,
and such plants now represent 20 percent of-total generation
capacity. Prices for natural gas delivered as fuel to power plants,
meanwhile, increased almost 95 percent between 2002 and
2006. While this increase is dramatic, costs for other fossil fuels
have also increased significantly. For example, coal prices have
increased about 40 percent since 2000. See EIA at 2-3, 7.
In the past, the environmental externalities of electricity
generating technologies were more easily quantified within the
traditional cost-based regulatory model described above. The
costs of mitigating such externalities, by installing new scrubbers or other pollution control equipment, for example, were
readily identifiable and utilities simply added such costs to the
other costs of operating a power plant (such as fuel and maintenance). Utilities were permitted to recover those costs in
their service rates. As a result, utility planners and regulators
have a measure of confidence in assessing the cost of meeting
environmental protection requirements and determining what
fuel source would be the most prudent investment.
It is far more difficult to readily identify a monetary cost
of mitigating the impact of climate change from a particular
type of generation resource. At this point, there is no common system of GHG regulation, and no commonly accepted
method of valuing the impact that limits on GHG emissions
could have on the costs of operating various types of power
plants. Despite the absence of a common trading platform for
emissions credits, some movement in the direction of a unified
method of valuing emissions traded on the market appears
to be emerging. While emissions credits trading markets are
beginning to emerge, until a unified valuation method fully
develops, however, utilities will not have the same measure of
confidence in assessing costs.
Coal-fired power plants (which make up almost 50 percent
of total electric generation capacity) are more impacted by this
problem than other plants. Even with the recent price increases,
coal is still significantly cheaper than other fossil fuel sources
used for electricity generation. See EIA at 3. As noted above,
however, coal-fired power plants are also one of the biggest
contributors to GHG emissions (as well as mercury and sulfur).
Accordingly, while the exact extent cannot be accurately
predicted today, the costs to operate such plants are likely to be
significantly affected by any future system of GHG regulation.
Recognizing the impact of coal-fired power plants on climate change, some states are taking actions to either prohibit
the construction of such plants or limit their use. For example,

in 2006 Idaho enacted a two-year moratorium on the permitting of certain coal-fired power plants to allow for the study of
the impacts of such plants on air and water quality. 2006 Idaho
Sess. Laws 367. In 2007, Kansas environmental and health
regulators became the first in the country to deny air quality permits to a coal-fired power plant based on its potential
to contribute to climate change. See, e.g., Bob Matyi, Citing
Climate Change, Kansas Environment Official Denies Sunflower
Permit, PLATTS COAL TRADER, Oct. 19, 2007 at 1.
Other states have legislatively set stringent emission limitations for new power plants or power supply arrangements
that will impact coal plants more directly. Recent legislation
passed in Montana, for example, prevents state regulators from
approving any acquisition or lease of a coal-based generating
resource unless it captures and sequesters at least 50 percent of
its carbon dioxide emissions. H.B. 25, 60th MT Legis. Minnesota passed a similar law in 2007 that prohibits the construction of new large generating facilities (other than peaking
plants fueled by natural gas) that would contribute to statewide GHG emissions. The Minnesota law also forbids longterm power purchase agreements or the importing of energy
from facilities that would increase statewide emissions. These
prohibitions do not apply, however, if the subject party offsets
the emissions. See MINN. STAT. § 216H (2007). Measures
like these appear intended to force the development of new
emissions-limiting coal-fired power plant technologies, like
carbon sequestration, creating a more active market for them.
Still, many states continue to see coal-fired generators as necessary to maintain reliable service and control rising electricity
rates. Proposals to construct new coal-fired generators are meeting
with approval-albeit not without controversy-in many areas,
particularly in the Southeast, where utilities argue that they have
less access to viable renewable resources like wind power. Kansas,
in fact, provides a good example of the dilemma of coal-fired
power: even after its regulators rejected a coal-fired power plant
out of concern for its impact on climate change, the Kansas
legislature moved to override that decision and allow the project
to proceed. David Klepper, Kansas Senate Sends Coal Plant Bill to
Sebelius, KANSAS CITY STAR (Mar. 7, 2008).
States are also recognizing the shortcomings of traditional
cost-based regulation in assigning a monetary value to GHG
emissions from generating sources when assessing utility supply plans and the resulting customer rates. Without a commonly accepted method for establishing the value of carbon
emissions from power plants, state regulators face difficulty
assessing the actual cost and potential rate impacts of utility
supply proposals. One fix to this problem is to enact legislation
specifically requiring utility regulators to set a value for GHG
emissions to be used in considering utility supply proposals.
Minnesota did just this in 2007. See MINN. STAT. § 216H.06
(2007). Utility regulators in other states, including California
and Colorado, have developed similar "carbon adders" for use
in assessing utility supply plans. For information on these and
similar efforts, see What's Being Done in the States, Pew Center
on Global Climate Change, at www.pewclimate.org/what s_
being-done/in thestates.
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Efforts to Encourage Fossil-Fuel
Alternatives
Given the problems of fossil-fuel generation in the face of
climate change and the uncertainty of the true costs (both
monetary and environmental) of such generation, state legislators and regulators are actively seeking to move away from
relying on GHG-emitting supply sources. A new emphasis on
renewable power has emerged.
The best example is wind power. Although it has been
only a small part of the energy picture in the United States,
wind power's role is growing because of the current economics of fossil fuels and new enthusiasm for alternatives to fossil
fuel. In fact, the United States recently overtook Spain as the
world's second-largest wind power market, after Germany,
with $9 billion invested last year. Clifford Krauss, Move Over,
Oil, There's Money in Texas Wind, N.Y. TIMwES, Feb. 23, 2008, at
B1 available at www.nytimes.com/2008/02/23/business/23wind.
html?scp=lst=cse.
States are considering whether wind could play a more significant role in the future. For example, last year the Oklahoma
legislature created the Oklahoma Electric Power Transmission
Task Force to study the feasibility of wind generation in the
Oklahoma Panhandle. See State to Get Free Wind Power Study
th*is April, J. REc. (Jan. 11, 2008). Since then, Southwest Power
Pool (SPP), a regional transmission organization, has agreed to
finance a study on the feasibility of wind power in Oklahoma,
calling Oklahoma the "Saudi Arabia of Wind." Id. "As part of a
10-year, $1.4 billion transmission expansion plan for the region,
SPP is working on a project known as the X Plan, which will
build wind generation capacity throughout the Central and
South Plains area in the shape of an 'x,' taking in much of Oklahoma's northwestern panhandle .... The Oklahoma Panhandle
alone has the potential to house more than 8,400 megawatts
of wind-generated capacity." Id. Wind is intermittent and thus
not reliable as an energy source in all areas. That fact has not
foreclosed investment in wind power, however. "A recent study
by Emerging Energy Research, a consulting firm in Cambridge,
Mass., projected $65 billion in investment from 2007 to 2015."
See Krauss, supra.
The most common mechanism adopted by states to push
the development of renewable energy has been Renewable
Portfolio Standards (RPS). Generally speaking, an RPS
requires that each electric utility procure a certain percentage
of the energy it supplies to customers from renewable sources
such as wind, solar, and geothermal power plants. RPS laws are
becoming more numerous and more aggressive, requiring everincreasing percentages of renewable energy. Such mechanisms
are also becoming more complex, and whether these mandates
will actually be met remains an open question.
Minnesota and New Mexico are among states that have
recently enacted significant increases in the level of their RPS.
Minnesota law now requires that by 2025, utilities must provide 25 percent of their total energy from renewable resources,
while New Mexico now requires 20 percent by 2020. 2007
Minn. Laws ch. 3; 2007 N.M. Laws ch. 4.
As for states adding increased complexity to their RPS laws,

Colorado, for example, recently enacted legislation that gives
greater weight to energy generated by solar-powered projects
and small, local "community-based" projects for purposes of
calculating a utility's, compliance with the RPS. Colo. H.B.
07-1281, 2007 Legislature (signed Mar. 27, 2007). New Hamp- shire's RPS, also one of the most recent, provides an excellent
example of the increasing specificity and complexity of what
on the surface appear to be relatively straightforward mandates.
New Hampshire's law requires its utilities to meet individual
percentage requirements in each of four classes, with each class
corresponding to different renewable energy technologies (or
sets of such technologies). N.H. STAT. ANN. § 362-F (2008).
Such laws requiring a minimum percentage come from specific
technologies, seek to "push" the development of new renewable
generating technologies, and encourage the development of
renewable energy industries.
One barrier to satisfying an RPS and encouraging expanded.
use of renewable and alternative energy is transmitting electricity from remote areas where renewable generating sources
are available to consumers in cities and suburbs. The transmission infrastructure is aging and in recent years has become
severely congested in certain areas. New transmission facilities
are costly, and siting them through environmentally sensitive
or populated areas is difficult and sometimes impossible.
State governments and regional bodies are beginning to step
in here as well. New Mexico, North Dakota, and Wyoming, for
example, all have similar statutes creating state-run transmission authorities, which are tasked with facilitating the development of new transmission facilities. 2007 N.M. Laws ch. 3;
N.D. CENT. CODE § 17-05 (2008); Wyo. STAT. AN. § 37-5-301
(2008). These authorities have significant powers to advance
construction of transmission lines (including, for example,
eminent domain authority). In some cases they are authorized
to own and operate transmission facilities in the event that no
other entity steps forward to construct lines proposed by. the
authority. Each state created its authority with an eye toward
developing particular resources within its borders: for example,
New Mexico's authority is directed to the development of
renewable energy, North Dakota's statute explicitly notes its
abundant coal and wind resources, and Wyoming's authority has
an expressed purpose of facilitating advanced coal technologies.
Rather than creating new state agencies and becoming
owners of transmission facilities, some states are attempting to
ease the burdens of construction of new transmission lines by
creating new regulatory schemes, including laws that guarantee
that utilities will recover the costs they incur in developing the
transmission infrastructure. Colorado provides one example:
recent legislation there entitles utilities to more quickly recover
the costs for transmission facilities they construct in areas where
transmission constraints restrict delivery of energy to consumers
or prevent the construction of new generation facilities. Colo.
S.B. 07-100, 2007 Legislature (signed Mar. 27, 2007).
States are also making efforts to capitalize on what has often been called the "low-hanging fruit" that can begin to solve
today's energy and climate challenges: energy efficiency and
distributed generation. These efforts represent, as discussed
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above, a move away from the old regulatory model whereby
utilities make more money by selling more energy. While
state initiatives in this area are too numerous to detail here,
some of the most important efforts relate to "decoupling"that is, changing the method of regulation to separate utility
profits from the volume of electricity and natural gas sold. For
example, Connecticut has legislatively mandated that regulators implement decoupling, while Maryland regulators have
ordered decoupling in individual utility rate proceedings. 2007
Conn. Acts 07-242; In re Application of Potomac Electric Power
Co., 2007 Md. PSC LEXIS 13 (July 19, 2007). Many states
are also implementing advanced "smart" metering programs.
In addition to measuring usage, smart meters are capable of
two-way communications and real-time pricing of electricity, i.e., charging different prices at different times of day to
reflect demand and encourage customers to use less energy at
peak periods. For a comprehensive list of recent state efforts in
this area, see FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, 2007
ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING, at
www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/09-07-demand-response.pdf.
Some jurisdictions are struggling with how to appropriately
compensate utilities for meeting efficiency and demand reduction goals. California regulators have adopted an incentive
mechanism that utilizes a "carrot and stick" approach. The
carrot component of this approach allows utilities to share in the
financial benefits achieved through reducing use by avoiding the
costs of adding new supply sources when they achieve 85 percent
of their energy savings goal (with the share of benefits the utility
may keep increasing when the utility reaches 100 percent of the
savings goal and above). The stick aspect of the approach means
that utilities incur financial penalties if they fail to achieve at
least 65 percent of their goal. In re Energy Efficiency Policies, 2007
Cal. PUC LEXIS 451 (Sept. 20, 2007). New Mexico passed
legislation requiring utilities to meet certain energy efficiency
goals-specifically, a reduction in demand of 5 percent by 2014
and 10 percent by 2020. That measure also directs state regulators
to consider what regulatory barriers to energy efficiency exist, and
to ensure that utilities have the opportunity to earn a profit on
energy efficiency programs. 2008 N.M. Laws ch. 24.
Even with an increased focus on saving energy, new
generating facilities will no doubt be required. The ability
of utilities to recover the costs of investment is an unavoidable issue when seeking to encourage new capital-intensive
infrastructure upgrades and generating projects. Several states
have implemented advanced cost recovery mechanisms, costrecovery guarantees, and tax incentives. These measures have
been aimed particularly at encouraging new nuclear plants, as
well as coal-fired power plants using new technologies such as
carbon sequestration and capture. With regard to new nuclear
plants, legislative and regulatory provisions passed in many
states (mostly in the Southeast) allow utilities to seek review
of the costs incurred in developing a nuclear plant even before
it is completed, and guarantee that such costs may be recovered in utility rates even if the plant is never completed. See
NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, STATUS REPORT: STATE LEGISLATION
AND REGULATIONS SUPPORTING NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION

(Oct. 2007), available at www.nei.org. Kentucky legislation
passed in 2007 includes a wide variety of tax and other incentives aimed at attracting the development of advanced energy
technologies, particularly those utilizing coal resources (including carbon capture and sequestration). 2007 Ky. Acts 1.

Unanswered Questions Remain
Taken together, this flurry of new energy policies (and other
actions not described here) creates an increasingly complex
system of regulation that puts pressure on the traditional model of
regulating utility service. Assessing utility revenues becomes more
than just a simple matter of approving the most prudent (i.e.,
cheape&s) investments and adding to the costs of those investments a reasonable rate of return. The competing priorities of an
RPS requirement, a legislative mandate to encourage energy efficiency or other alternatives, or other policies enacted in response
to climate change and rising prices add new considerations for
regulators. The significant challenge to traditional regulation presented by energy efficiency mandates and "decoupling" is just one
example. Regulators must decide how best to structure financial
incentives to encourage utilities to meet energy efficiency goals,
which would otherwise run counter to the traditional notion of
selling more electricity to make more money. This shift leads to a
host of questions: At some point do the financial rewards become
too great? Do those financial rewards (such as sharing in savings,
as in California) inappropriately put the incentive with the utility, rather than the ultimate consumers of electricity? States are
still struggling to answer these questions.
State efforts to develop new transmission facilities to bring
alternative energy to consumers also raise questions about
federalism: Will such state-by-state and regional efforts bear
real fruit? Or will states continue to focus on parochial interests,
requiring federal intervention? The federal government only recently gained limited authority to intervene to site transmission
lines under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which gives federal
regulators permission to site transmission lines in certain corridors if state regulators have previously not granted such lines.
See 16 U.S.C. § 824p. States continue to be leery of such federal
authority, opposing it in the courts and Congress. Regional
agreements among governors of the midwestern and western
states to cooperate on developing transmission infrastructure
represent encouraging signs that states may be seeking to work
together.
Structuring RPS laws, and the regulations that implement
them, also presents challenges. While more complex RPS laws
like those described above may be one means of pushing the development of a variety of renewable energy generating technologies, placing too much emphasis on new and untested technologies that may ultimately prove infeasible creates a risk of failing to
develop enough renewable energy to meet the goals of combating climate change and moderating prices. Moreover, whether
renewable energy resources can be developed fast enough to meet
RPS mandates remains an open question. In Nevada, in fact,
state regulators recently found that utilities had failed to comply
with portions of that state's RPS. See Nevada Power's Failureto
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Buy Renewable Energy May Spur Regulatory Changes, PLATrS ELEC.
U-IL. WK., OCT. 29, 2007, at 9. Overseas, the United Kingdom
has experienced difficulty achieving full compliance with its version of an RPS. See, e.g., Peter M. Connor, The UK Renewables
Obligation, in SWITCHING TO RENEWABLE POWER: A FRAMEwoK
FOR THE 21sT CENTmY (Volkmar Lauber ed., 2005).
Ultimately, advanced cost recovery measures may be the
most important step governments can take to ensure that alternatives come to fruition. For example, the first wave of nuclear
*plants were ten years and hundreds of millions of dollars in the
making, and ultimately states did not pennit their utilities to
recover their costs when nuclear power fell out of public favor
in the wake of Three Mile Island and economic changes in the
costs of other power sources. See Richard J. Pierce Jr., Will We
Revive the Nuclear Option?, American Bar Association Section of Energy, Environment and Resources 15th Section Fall
Meeting (Sept. 2007). The advanced cost-recovery measures
noted above appear to recognize this history. Nevertheless,
allowing for the recovery of costs for generating resources that
ultimately are not built presents political and economic risks.
These initiatives and others cropping up around the country
raise a fundamental question for the future: what is the guiding principle of regulation? The Federal Power Act regulates
wholesale electricity, but applies standards that are analogous to
the standards applied under most state rate regulation statutesnamely, that service be in the "public interest" and that rates be
"just and reasonable." The Supreme Court has described these
standards as requiring regulators to "ensur[e] plentiful supplies of
electricity ... at just and reasonable prices." NAACP v. FPC,425
U.S. 662 (1976). "Plentiful" supplies may no longer be a favored
approach given the new understanding of the impact of generating those supplies on the climate. And as noted elsewhere, the
generating resource with the lowest cost may not always be the
most prudent investment in light of global warming.

Will State Efforts Be Overtaken
by Federal Action?
The glaring question with regard to climate change broadly, and
perhaps even with regard to the new energy policies born out of
the problem of climate change, is whether the federal government

will embrace the state and local actions that have already been
initiated. Previously, in other policy areas the federal government
has embraced the prior efforts made by the state "laboratories"
(and in some cases chosen only to supplement them). The federal
government may choose to continue the tradition of cooperative
federalism by including a role for state government in address-

ing GHG issues. As former U.S. Senator Timothy Wirth (now
president of the United Nations Foundation) recently noted,
efforts to address climate change at the state level may come to

mirror the other important policy changes that were originally
initiated in the states, such as consumer safety laws or civil rights
advances: "None of those started in Washington; they started out

in the country." Jim Efstathiou Jr. and Adam Satariano, Climate
Plans by New York, FloidaProd U.S. on Global Warming (Jan. 30,
2008), available at www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_

en&refer=&sid=aaNOeTfdMAK8. Part II of the Federal Power
Act (establishing regulation of wholesale sales and transmission
of electricity in interstate commerce) provides an example. That
statute was passed to fill the gap left by state regulation of electric
utilities following the Supreme Court's decision in Public Utils.
Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
California's recent attempt to implement its own motor vehicle emissions standards in response to climate change provides
a cautionary note to those hoping that cooperative federalism will
continue. On February 29, 2008, the Environmental Protection
Agency denied a request by California for a waiver of the Clean
Air Act's (CAA) prohibitions to allow it to implement its own
State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, which would
have provided more stringent protections against GHG. See
www.epa.gov/otaq/ca-waiver.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
Section 209 of the Clean Air Act requires that EPA grant a
waiver for California standards unless EPA finds that California
"was arbitrary and capricious in its finding that its standards are
in the aggregate at least as protective of public health and welfare
as applicable federal standards; does not need such standards to
meet compelling and extraordinary conditions; or has proposed
standards not consistent with Section 2 02 (a) of the Clean Air
Act." 42 U.S.C. § 7543. Employing a comparative analysis that
judged the threat of global climate change to be as significant in
the entire country as it is in California, the EPA based its denial
on a finding that "California does not need its greenhouse gas
standards for new motor vehicles to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions." 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156-169 (Mar. 6, 2008).
Although EPA noted the "serious challenge" of global
climate change, it concluded that section 209(b)(1)(B) was
"intended to allow California to promulgate state standards
applicable to emissions from new motor vehicles to address
pollution problems that are local or regional" and not to "allow
California to promulgate state standards for emissions from
new motor vehicles designed to address global climate change
problems." Id. EPA's analysis relied on a finding that the effects of climate change for California are not "compelling and
extraordinary compared to the effects in the rest of the country."
EPA expressly declined to address whether the criteria for denial
of a waiver were met under CAA section 209(b)(1) (A) and
(C). Provision (A) provides a basis for a denial of California's
requested waiver if EPA finds that California was "arbitrary and
capricious in its finding that its standards are in the aggregate
at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable
federal standards." Provision (C) provides a basis for denial of
a requested waiver if California's proposed standards are "not
consistent with Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act."
EPAs denial of California's waiver request suggests that the current administration believes a comprehensive approach to climate
change is necessary. If Congress accepts this rationale and chooses
to address climate change with a comprehensive federal system,
preemption of state and local efforts to combat climate change is
a real possibility. Congress, in fact, is considering this and other
issues concerning the relationship between existing state efforts and
possible federal legislation. See House Committee on Energy and
continued on page 55
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agency action. Judicial statutory interpretation, however, quickly
clarified (or transformed, depending on your perspective) that
the seemingly docile procedural requirement in fact contained a
formidable substantive mandate of the Act. This provision ismore
commonly, and perhaps more appropriately, referred to as the "no
jeopardy" provision, and even as amended retains substantive bite.
A second stealth provision resides in section 8a of the ESA.
Modestly titled "Convention implementation," the name suggests little more than administrative direction. However, closer
inspection reveals that the provision potentially packs more than
procedural minutia. With escalating species losses worldwide,
there seems little doubt that future litigants will look to apply this
provision in aid of biodiversity and species concentration. At such
time, the federal courts will be forced to grapple, yet again, with
the scope and meaning of an ESA stealth provision.
The objective of the article is "to identify an approach to
statutory interpretation of such ESA stealth provisions worthy
of application in these endeavors-an interpretive approach
that allows rational and just results or at least avoids perverse
pernicious ones." Part I of the article reviews prevailing theories of statutory interpretation, examining in turn legislative
intent, textualism, dynamic statutory interpretation, and administrative agency deference. In Part II, the author provides a
short history of the ESA, beginning with ESA precursors and
adoption of the ESA in 1973, and includes brief descriptions
of ESA sections 7 and 8a. In Part III, the author examines
a vast array of approaches used to interpret just one of the ESA's
stealth provisions in just one case before the federal courts. The
provision is section 7. The statutory interpretations arise in

none other than the legendary Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill
(TVA v. Hill) case, and its associated lower court rulings, where,
as the story goes, a few tiny fish blocked the opening of the
mighty Tellico Dam (at least for a short while).
In Part IV, the author suggests "the least bad approach" for
statutory challenges of ESA stealth provisions, which she summarizes at the beginning of Part IV as follows:
As noted in the general discussion of statutory interpretation
approaches in Part I, there is no perfect approach; all are indeterminate to some degree and each has certain other weaknesses
vis-A-vis the democratic process, and pragmatic criteria against
which they are typically judged. Further, the dramatic array of
interpretations of section 7's consultation requirement described
in Part III reflect the confounding nature of stealth provisions and
the apparent theoretical disarray absent a common or preferred
approach for attacking this interpretive conundrum. Recognizing
these inherent limits and situational realities, this Part offers a
least bad approach for interpretation of stealth ESA provisions.
The proposed least bad approach for interpreting ESA stealth
provisions relies on plain language interpretation grounded in
purposivism and informed by contemporary contextual considerations. The touchstone for interpreting ESA stealth provisions,
as with all statutory provisions, must remain the plain language
of the law. But... the plain language cannot "stand alone." This
is a soft, not new, textualism approach. It calls for contextual
reinforcement based on the reason for and the spirit of the ESA.
Additionally, in a nod to pragmatism, the least bad approach
acknowledges temporal socio-cultural-political changes and
advances in scientific knowledge and methodology. T

Climate Change and Energy Alternatives
(continuedfrom page 14)

Commerce Staff, Climate Change Legislation Design White Paper:
Appropriate Roles for Different Levels of Government (Feb. 2008).
Whether federal preemption would cause states to also reassess the
energy policies they have enacted in response to climate change is
an open question. The answer to that question may depend in part
on how "comprehensive" the federal program ultimately is--for
example, will it include a national RPS, or national standards
for energy efficiency? Federal legislation seeking to establish such
measures on a national level has failed previously.
Energy is intertwined with every facet of the modem economy,
and the production and use of energy are recognized as a key
contributor to the problem of climate change. Affordable and reliable energy provides important benefits to the economy, but also
profound risks of both an economic and environmental nature.
U.S. leadership in this area is of crucial importance in terms of both
the effects on the environment and the influence on other nations.
Other countries look to the United States, as the world's largest
consumer of energy, to develop a leadership role in energy policywhether that policy is developed at the state or national level.

The flurry of state and local activity in the area of climate
change and energy in recent years recognizes the importance
and risks of energy use. The measures they are taking now may
be just the beginning of fundamental changes in electricity
policy and regulation to address these challenges. If the federal
government continues to stay on the sidelines, whether these
new regulatory structures and initiatives succeed or die of their
own complexity will ultimately determine how the United
States responds to both global climate change and the challenges of providing affordable energy supply. While some of the
state electricity policy efforts noted here are peculiar to state
regulatory jurisdiction, others (notably the RPS) could be adopted on a national level. Moreover, many questions produced
by the recent landslide of state and local policy initiatives, and
the interaction of those initiatives with possible comprehensive
federal policy, cannot be answered at this stage. Nevertheless,
state and local governments are moving to the forefront of
energy policy, much as they have in carbon regulation. These
efforts demand close attention and analysis.
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